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Abstract:
This article investigates the distinction between breach of license and
infringement of property rights, and how damages ought to be
measured for each. It identifies two remedial puzzles. First, under
current law the line between breach of a license contract and
infringement of a property right is murky, and thus minor differences
between violations could lead to major differences in damage
measures. Second, damages for infringement are augmented in a
subtle but distortive way, by giving owners an option to choose
between the greater of two computation measures, each based on
different information. The article argues that these existing remedial
patterns are not justified. If provides an alternative framework for
determining whether a violation is breach or infringement. In a
nutshell, violations involving activities that an owner would want to
license in a separate transaction, or not to license at all, should be
regarded as infringements and sanctioned more severely.
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INTRODUCTION
This article investigates the difference between breach and infringement. A licensee
who made an unlicensed use—did he breach the contract or did he infringe upon
the property rights of the licensor? Is he liable for breach, or for infringement
remedies? It is a distinction that has important implications for measuring damages.
It has proven to be a difficult line to draw, raising issues that are regarded “among
the knottiest” in intellectual property adjudication.1
Consider the following example. A copyright owner licenses the right to publish the
work in a specific medium, say, paperback edition, to a licensee. The licensee commits
one of three wrongful acts: (1) he launches the distribution prematurely, thereby cutting
into the owner’s revenue from other media of distribution; (2) He distributes the work
in additional media that were not covered by the license; (3) he makes changes to the
text of the work, cutting chapters and revising the story’s ending. In each of these cases,
did he commit a breach of contract? Or did he infringe upon the owner’s copyright? Are
damages limited to the owner’s lost profit, which might often be low or hard to prove,
or do the damages include also the violator’s profit, which are higher and easier to
prove?
In the first part of this article, I examine the conceptual structure of the breach‐versus‐
infringement remedial doctrines. I highlight two puzzling regularities. The first puzzle
has to do with way the law divides the work between breach and infringement, and
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3 Nimmer on Copyright §12.01[A], p. 12‐5 (2010)
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more generally between contract and property. I argue that the rules determining
which damage rule applies are mechanical, almost arbitrary, and devoid of
normative foundations. They do not conform to any discernable policy concern.
That is, the choice of remedy is not a product of optimal calibration of the sanction,
but rather a function of technical characterizations of the violation.
The second puzzle concerns the manner in which infringement damages are
calculated. In a nutshell, the law allows the aggrieved owner to choose one of two
computation measures of recovery. The first is based on ex‐post information: the
actual lost profit, or the actual realized profit by the infringer, as they are known at
the time of the dispute resolution. The second is based on ex ante values: the
expected value of the infringed right prior to the infringement, before the actual loss
or profit became known. Both measures are sensible, if pursued consistently, The
anomaly arises, I show, from the way they are combined. In a subtle way, the law
entitles the aggrieved owner to choose the greater of the two measures, ex‐post and
ex‐ante loss. If the ex‐post loss is high, it will be chosen; if it is low, the owner can
choose the ex‐ante value instead. As a result, the expected recovery is bolstered,
creating two distortions. First, recovery exceeds the injury; and second, the excess
recovery depends on factors that are wholly irrelevant in the remedial goals.
Surprisingly, the expected recovery depends on the volatility of the value of the
infringed right.
After describing these patterns of recovery for unlicensed use, the article explores
reasons to treat infringement more harshly than contract breach. Part II of the
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article finds that some of the standard justifications for adjusting remedies—
imperfect enforcement and pre‐contractual investments—do not easily explain the
doctrinal regularities we observe. Part III, then, provides a road map to resolving the
breach‐versus‐infringement problem. It identifies situations in which enhanced
property protection to the owner is efficient. In these situations, a violation ought to
be classified as infringement. Breach or infringement, it argues, cannot be
distinguished along definitions relating to the “nature” of contract or IP, but rather
labels affixed to the conclusion of the inquiry, when should damages be bolstered.

I. TWO REMEDIAL DICHOTOMIES
A. Breach v. Infringement: the Contract/Property Boundary
The first remedial dichotomy arises in cases in which the parties negotiated a
license but the licensee overreached and made unauthorized uses. This wrongful
action by the licensee could be both a breach of the license contract, giving rise to
the common law’s contract remedies, and an infringement of the licensor‘s
intellectual property, with the remedies provided by statutes. For example, the
author who licensed the paperback publishing rights to a licensee, who proceeded
to violate the license—which remedy is the author entitled to, the lost profit
damages of contract law or the statutory damages of intellectual property law?
In copyright cases, recovering for infringement could be valuable to the owner
because the Copyright Act grants him the disgorgement remedy.2 Disgorgement
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See Section 504(b) of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 504 (2000).
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damages could be substantially higher than the normal contract damages that
measure the right holder’s lost profit. In patent cases, the shift from contract to
infringement remedies could also increase the magnitude of damages. Further,
unlike contract recovery, infringement of intellectual property opens the door to
recovery of treble damages and attorney fees in certain cases,3 as well as a longer
statute of limitation. Other time, the owner might prefer contract damages. Suing for
breach of license does not involve the risk of patent invalidation;4 or, breach of
contract may be easier to prove than patent infringement.5
Thus, in the paperback publishing example, if the licensee violates the terms of the
license by disseminating the paperback edition prematurely, what is the copyright
holder’s remedy? The copyright holder’s lost profit is measured by the reduced sales
of the hardcover edition that result from the early launching of the paperback.
Recovery of this loss is the ordinary contract expectation damage remedy. The
infringer, however, enjoyed increased sales due to the premature release of the
paperback. Recovery of this wrongfully received profit is the ordinary remedy for
copyright infringement. The two measures could be dramatically different. The lost
profit from another month of sales of hardcover books could be small while the
increased profit from premature sales of paperback might be substantial.6

35 U.S.C. §§ 283‐85 (2000) (patent statute); 15 U.S.C. §§ 34‐35 (trademark); 17 U.S.C. §§
502‐05 (2000) (copyright).
4 Robert Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 1477, 1511
(2005).
5
See Ely Lilly and Co. v. Genentech, Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1531, 1534 (1990)
6
See United States Naval Institute v. Charter Communications, Inc., 936 F.2d 692 (2nd Cir. 1991),
where the profit from lost sales of hardcover was estimated at less than $35,000, whereas the
profit from additional sales of paperback were alleged to exceed, $700,000—a multiple of 20!
3
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Both the contract damage rule and the infringement remedy are sensible. Each is
consistent with the fundamental remedial principles of their respective areas of law,
contracts and IP. The problem in their application is the fuzzy boundary between
the two. In any individual case, it is not clear as a matter of legal doctrine which
measure applies. The rules determining when the aggrieved party is entitled to the
infringement remedy and when he is restricted to the contract remedy are technical,
almost arbitrary, and seemingly devoid of normative foundations. In the remainder
of this section, I outline some of the distinctions drawn by the law to sort out breach
versus infringement.
First, the answer depends on whether the license is exclusive or not. For example, in
the above premature‐publishing example, if the licensee had an exclusive license to
publish the paperback edition, his wrongful act is merely a breach of contract. The
reason given by the court is mechanical: an exclusive license is regarded as a
transfer of the “ownership” of the copyright rights, and the exclusive licensee—as a
the person who now owns some copyright rights—is “incapable of infringing a
copyright interest that is owned by him.”7 He is only “capable of breaching the
contractual obligations imposed on it by the license.”8 If, instead, the license was not
exclusive, the breaching licensee could be liable for copyright infringement
damages.9

7

Id, at 695.
Id.
9
Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1999)(Generally, a
“copyright owner who grants a nonexclusive license to use his copyrighted material waives his
right to sue the licensee for copyright infringement’ and can sue only for breach of contract.”)
8
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A second doctrinal wrinkle that divides the work between contract and IP remedies
is the promise/condition distinction. If the licensee breaches a promissory
obligation under the license agreement, he is held in breach and is only liable for
contract damages. If, on the other hand, the licensee fails to satisfy a condition
precedent, the license effectively does not exist and in the absence of a contract the
violator is liable for infringement remedies.10 For example, if a licensee fails to
comply with the contractual provision to affix the correct copyright notice to the
materials reproduced under the license, is this a breach of its license obligation or
failure to satisfy a condition upon the license? There may be some superfluous logic
to the distinction between obligations and conditions—contract damages are
relevant only when contract obligations kick in, whereas as failure of a condition
suggests that the obligations never arise—but the rules determining when contract
provisions are conditions and when they are promissory obligations are notoriously
fluid,11 inadequate to provide a sound foundation for the election of remedy. Indeed,
the above scenario, in which the licensee failed to affix a proper copyright notice,
was held at times to be a failure of condition, making the violation an infringement
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Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 229 (2nd Cir. 1998). See, generally, 3 Nimmer on Copyright
§10.15[A][2], p. 10‐116 (2010); Edwin E. Richards, Drafting Licenses to Guide Whether Potential
Disputes Lie in Contract or Infringement, 7 Computer L. Rev. & Tech. J. 45, 51 (2002).
11
See, e.g., Howard v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 540 F.2d 695 (4th Cir. 1976); Harmon Cable
Communications v. Scope Cable Television, Inc. (468 NW 2d 350, 358 (Neb. 1991) (“Courts have
struggled for centuries with differentiating between conditions and promises.”) See, generally,
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 227.
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of copyright;12 and other times a breach of obligation, making the violation subject
only to contract breach remedies.13
A third distinction working to mark of the elusive boundary between breach and
infringement is between limitations on the scope of license versus affirmative
covenant. Consider, for example, a provision stating: “the licensee agrees to engage
only in specific use X.” It may be characterized as a limitation‐on‐the‐scope of the
license, and a licensee who makes use beyond X there does not have a license for it,
thus committing an infringement. Alternatively, it may be characterized as a
negative promise by the licensee, “the licensee promises not to make uses other
than X,” in which case a licensee whose use goes beyond X would be in breach of an
a promise, subject only of breach of contract remedies.14 Unfortunately, the
distinction between scope‐of‐license and negative‐promise is a semantic distinction,
at best, and most license provisions are both.15 It is all the more superficial given
that courts can find in any license limitation a blanket implied promise not to exceed
the bound of the license restriction or to commit any infringement. This transforms

12

County of Ventura v. Blackburn, 362 F.2d 515, 520 (9th Cir. 1976); National Comics Pub. v.
Fawcett Pub., 191 F.2d 594, 600 (2nd Cir. 1951).
13
Fantastic Fakes, Inc. v. Pickwick Int’l., Inc., 661 F.2d 479, 487 (Ga. 1981);
14
See, e.g., SCO Group, Inc. v. Novell, Inc. 2007 WL 2327587, at 40 (Utah 2007); Sun
Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115, 1121‐22 (9th Cir., 1999). In that case, the
infringement/breach dichotomy mattered for the purpose of preliminary remedies. An
infringement of IP gives rise to the presumption of irreparable harm and to preliminary
injunction, whereas a breach of license does not.
15
It is not even clear whether this distinction is a matter for contract interpretation. Courts
recognize that the question whether the provision is a limitation‐on‐the‐scope or an
affirmative‐covenant is a matter for interpretation of the license contract, but they also say
that the cannons of interpretation from contract law cannot interfere with federal copyright
law and policy. See 188 F.3d, at 1122; S.O.S. Inc. v. Payday, Inc. 886 F.2d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir.
1989).
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every infringement into a breach of contract.16 Thus, for example, when the license
states that the licensee’s products may not compete with the licensor’s, a violation
by the licensee is held to be both breach and infringement, thus allowing the
licensor to choose the remedy.17
Some of the rules regarding the breach/infringement interface come from jurisdiction
disputes. Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over copyright infringement actions,
whereas state courts adjudicate contracts disputes. A complaint asserting breach of
license and infringement of copyright—does it arise under copyright law, or under
contract law? Courts utilize a variety of tests to determine if the complaint requires a
construction of the Copyright Act or of the contract.18 Many courts hold that the
complaint arises under the Copyright Act if it is for a remedy granted by the act—a “well
pleaded complaint rule” that gives the plaintiff the outright choice.19 This choice is
constrained by a variety of tests: whether the dispute is “informed by the substantive
law of copyright,”20 whether it is within the “subject matter of copyright,”21 whether
there is more than “an aroma of copyright,”22 and more.

See, e.g., Shaw v. E.I du Pont deNemours * Co., 226 A.2d 903, 905 (Vt. 1966); Phillip B.C.
Jones, Violation of a Patent License Restriction: Breach of Contract or Patent Infringement?,
33 J. L. & Tech. (IDEA) 225, 229 (1992‐93).
17 SCO Group, Inc. v. Novell, Inc. 2007 WL 2327587, at 39‐41.
18 See James M. McCarthy, Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction: When Does a Case Involving the
Breach of a Copyright Licensing Contract Arise under the Copyright Act, 19 U. Dayton L. Rev. 165
(1993).
19
T.B Harms Co. v. Aliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2nd Cir. 1964); Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe,
204 F.3d 343 (2nd cir. 2000).
20
SAPC, Inc., v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 1009 (MA 1988).
21 La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1199 (10th Cir.
2005).
22
3 Nimmer on Copyright §12.01[A][2], p. 12‐22.4 (2010)
16
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Moreover, the determination of breach versus infringement depends on the rules of
contract cancellation. The license itself may contain a reversion clause that
automatically terminates the licensee’s rights.23 Or, the license can be affirmatively
rescinded as a result of material breach (e.g., non‐payment of royalties).24 When the
breach of the license is such that grants the owner the power to revoke the license,
the owner has a clear path to infringement remedies: he cancels the license, and
with the license no longer in place, the only remaining ground for recovery is
property infringement. In fact, the same violation can give rise to both damages for
breach (prior to the license termination) and for infringement (per the period
following termination).25 It is hard to explain, though, why the mechanical act of
affirmative termination should affect the magnitude of damages.
In sum, the law entitles the right holder to two types of remedies—two causes of
action—but does not draw a clear and reasoned boundary between the causes of
action. Small, hairsplitting differences in facts or characterization could lead to
dramatic, discontinuous jumps in the magnitude of damages. At times, the owner
would be allowed to choose which remedy to claim and could wait to plead the
count that provides the higher recovery.26 Judge Cardozo explained that

See Richards, supra note 10, at 52.
Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 229, 237‐38 (2nd Cir. 1998); 3 Nimmer on Copyright §10.15[A][3],
pp. 10‐117 (2010)
25 See, e.g., Wisconsin Alumni Research foundation v. General Electirc Co., 880 F.Supp. 1266,
1274‐76 (Wis. 1995)
26
See Merges, supra note 4, at 1505. Generally, parties can join in the complaint a claim for
disgorgement and a claim for expectation damages, postponing the election of the remedy until
it becomes clear, at trial, which of the two measure is greater. Court even permit plaintiffs to
amend their suits and shift the basis of recovery. See, for example, Matarese v. Moore‐
23
24
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“the author who suffers infringement of his copyright at the hands of a
licensee may […] seek redress under the statute in the federal courts. But that
is not in all circumstances the only remedy available. If the same act is not
merely an invasion of a statutory right of property but also the breach of a
contract […] he may count up the breach or the abuse and have relief
accordingly.”27
Other times, there is no choice—the remedy is dictated by legal doctrine—but from
the licensee’s perspective the remedy could turn on unpredictable or superficial
factors.
B. Ex Post v. ExAnte measures of damages
A second remedial dichotomy arises in cases in which the violation is clearly an
infringement. The violator infringed by committing an unlicensed, unauthorized use.
If detected and found liable for infringement, what is the measure of damages that
the violator owes the owner? Patent law and Copyright law give the owner yet
another choice.
Consider Patent law first. One measure of damages—which I will label the “ex‐post
measure”—sets the recovery according to the actual profit that the patentee lost as
a result of the infringement.28 It may be difficult to identify and prove the exact lost
profit, but if the evidentiary burden is overcome, the aggrieved patentee may
recover his actual loss. This is an ex‐post measure because it depends on
information that becomes available post‐infringement, at trial, regarding the
realization of business outcomes.

McCormack Lines, Inc., 158 F.2d 631 (2nd Cir. 1947); Frontier Management Co. v. Balboa Ins. Co,
658 F.Supp.987 (Mass. 1986).
27 Underhill v. Schenck, 143 N.E. 773, 775 (N.Y. 1924).
28
35 U.S.C. 284 (2000)
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Alternatively, the patentee can forgo the ex‐post recovery and collect instead an “ex‐
ante measure” of damages, equal to the value that would have attached to the right
prior to infringement, before the parties acquire information about the actual value
of the license to the infringer or the lost profit of the patentee. The ex ante measure
is estimated as the hypothetical royalties the owner would have negotiated in a
hypothetical license, had the infringer approached him and sought to secure a
licensed use.29 This hypothetical royalty measure is merely an educated guess—an
average. It reflects the expected value of the patent to both parties and their relative
bargaining power.30 It is an intermediate quantum that depends more on market
data and the distribution of profits than on the actual true realized value of the
patent.
Both the ex‐post and the ex‐ante measures are sensible. Each conforms to a different
remedial conception. The ex‐post measure serves with great accuracy the make‐
whole principle. The ex‐ante measure mimics the bargain that would have been
struck. It is the gap‐filler that protects the patentee’s right to veto non‐consensual

29

Id. (“Damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty.”) See,e.g., Georgia‐Pacific v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(SDNY 1970)Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc. 575 F.2d 1152, 1157 (6th Cir. 1978)
(“When actual damages, e.g., lost profit, cannot be proved, the patent owner is entitled to a
reasonable royalty.”)
30
Lucent Technology, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1325, 1332 (C.A Fed 2009) (“The
hypothetical negotiation tries, as best as possible, to recreate the ex ante licensing negotiation
scenario and to describe the resulting agreement”; “aim to elucidate how the parties would
have valued the patented feature during the hypothetical negotiation”).
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transfers. The problem in that they are both available and that the plaintiff, who has
a choice which one to claim, and can opt for the greater of the two.31
To understand why this prerogative to choose the greater of the two measures is
problematic, let’s assess the expected value of the combined remedy. At the time of
infringement, the ex‐post damage that would accrue to the patentee, in terms of lost
profit, is uncertain. If, by the time litigation occurs, the ex‐post lost‐profit measure
turns out to be high, the patentee will then claim and recover the actual lost profit.
If, instead, this measure turns out to be low or zero, the patentee will then claim and
recover not the actual loss, but rather the ex ante damage equal to the hypothetical
royalty. Thus, if we analogize the ex‐post profit to a lottery (in the sense that it is
unknown early on whether it will be high or zero value), the “greater of” remedial
regime gives the claimant an inflated portfolio of claims. He can recover the actual
prize when the lottery is won; and he can recover the expected value of the lottery
when the draw is zero. The expected value of the recovery is greater than the
expected value of the lottery/patent! That is, the patent is worth more when
infringed, because the recovery rights exceed the expected stream of profits when
not infringed.32

31

Bandag Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., 704 F.2d 1578, 1583 (Fed Cir. 1983) (a reasonable royalty is
“merely the floor below which damages shall not fall”); Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1157.
32
To illustrate, imagine a lottery with 1% chance of winning a prize of $1000, and 99% chance of
winning $0. The expected value of the lottery is $10. Under the “greater of” recovery regime,
the claimant recovers $1000 if he wins (with probability 1%), and $10 if he loses (with
probability %99). The expected value of the recover is just about $20, twice the expected value
of the lottery.
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This “greater of” structure of remedies is not unique to patent infringement.33 It
arises also under copyright law. A copyright owner can disgorge the infringer’s
actual profit, or—if this measure turns out to be too low (if the infringer made no
profit)—he can recover statutory damages under Section 504(c) of the Copyright
Act.34
The effect of a “greater of” regime is distortive because the portfolio of damages it
creates ends up depending on arbitrary, irrelevant, factors. That is, infringements
that create the same expected harm at the time they are committed would
potentially lead to different expected recovery. To see why, consider the following
numerical example:
Example 1: compare three patents with same expected profit of $1000. They differ
in the distribution of profits:
 Patent 1 creates a 100% chance of $1000 profits
 Patent 2 creates a 50% chance of $2000 (and 50% chance of $0)
 Patent 3 creates a 1% chance of $100,000 (and 99% chance of $0).
Assume that in all three cases a license or infringement would deprive the patentee
of the profit. The royalty the patentee would therefore charge for a hypothetical
license—the ex ante measure—is $1000. Under the “greater‐of” regime, the
expected recovery for infringement of Patent 1 will be $1000;35 for infringement of

33

For a general discussion of this type of problem in various areas of the law, see Omri Ben‐
Shahar and Robert Mikos, The (Legal) Value of Chance: Distorted Measures of Recovery in
Private Law, 7 Amer. L. & Econ. Rev. 484 (2005); Saul Levmore, Obligation or Restitution for Best
Effort, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1411 (1994).
34
17 U.S.C.A. 504.
35
For patent 1, the ex‐post and the ex‐ante measure are identical, $1000, because there is no
uncertainty about profits.
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Patent 2 expected recovery will be $1500;36 and for infringement of patent 3
expected recovery will be just under $2000.37
In other words, the greater‐of regime entitles the patentee to recover the actual
value of the patent (measured by the profit he would have made), bundled with a
put option to sell this right to the infringer for the hypothetical license fee of $1000.
The excess recovery under this regime equals the value of such put option. The
more volatile the ex‐post value of the asset—Patent 3 is more volatile than Patent 2,
which is more volatile than Patent 1—the more worthy is the put option, and the
more substantial is the excess recovery enjoyed by the patentee. The expected
recovery depends not only on the expected value of the patent, but also its volatility.
Thus, as with the first dichotomy (the license/infringement dualilty), here too the
law entitles the right holder to two types of remedies. Here they differ not by the
type of interest protected, but rather by the information inputted into the
measurement, or, more precisely, the timing in which this information is sampled.
Here, infringements that look the same ex ante in terms of their economic impact
end up being treated differently by the law of remedies. Again, small differences
(here, having to do with the variance of profits) could lead to dramatic,
discontinuous jumps in the value of the remedial options.
36

For infringement of patent 2, the patentee will recover the actual loss of $2000 with 50%
chance, and will recover the hypothetical royalty of $1000 with 50% chance. The weighted sum
is 0.52000 + 0.51000 = 1500
37
For infringement of patent 3, the patentee will recover it actual loss of $100,000 with 1%
chance, and will recover the hypothetical royalty of $1000 with 99% chance. The weighted sum
is 0.01100,000 + 0.991000 = 1990. One can imagine scenarios in which the expected recovery
is even higher. A patent that creates a 50% chance of $10,000 gain and 50% chance of $8000
loss has an expected value of $1000, and the expected recovery is $5500.
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II. REASONS FOR THE REMEDIAL STRUCTURE
This section explores possible rationales for the existing remedial structure.
Specifically, it looks at two features that the discussion above uncovered. First, that
infringement by a licensee leads, on average, to harsher remedies than breach of the
license. That is, the option to elect a remedy from IP law operates to increase the
burden of liability that a breaching licensee faces. Can this damage booster be
explained? Second, we saw that there are some specific patterns that affect the
licensor’s choice of remedy and open the door for greater recovery. Are these the
right factors to use as damage boosters?
A. Imperfect Enforcement
Not all violations are enforced. One of the main reasons for imperfect enforcement,
is imperfect detection: the likelihood that the infringer will escape sanction. A
familiar feature of an optimal damages rule is the imperfect detection multiplier.
The idea is straightforward: when the probability of detection of the wrongful act is
less than 1, the magnitude of the damages have to be multiplied by the inverse of
this probability. Thus, for example, if the probability of detection is 1/3, the
damages need to be multiplied by 3. What the wrongdoer gains by not being
detected some of the time he loses in those cases in which he is detected and faces
augmented damages. The key is to inflict on the wrongdoer with an expected

15

damage payment that is invariant to the probability of detection, so as to maintain
optimal deterrence.38
What does this basic framework tell us about the dichotomous remedial structures
of IP law? We saw that the effect of these remedy regimes is to create a super‐
compensatory structure, in which the right holder is compensated, in expected value
terms, for more than his loss. Thus, it might be conjectured that the excess‐
compensation is a way to offset the under‐deterrence arising from imperfect
detection. Some right holders never detect or sue; those that do detect the
infringements and sue are overcompensated.
Consistent with this conjecture, the first relevant distinction is between cases in
which a license exists and cases in which it does not. If the unauthorized use
occurred in the presence (and thus in breach) of a license, the probability of
detection by the right holder is likely to be higher than if the unauthorized use
occurred in the absence of such license. Owners know the parties to whom they
license some rights. They know where to look if they want to monitor their
licensees, and they anticipate the timing, the location, and the medium of the use.
Unlicensed infringers, by contrast, are strangers. They could be anywhere, anytime,
in any format or medium. Detection of their infringing activities is more erratic and
less likely. Thus, within the universe of unauthorized users, the probability of
detection is higher when the user also happens to be a licensee.

38

Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach 76 J. Pol. Econ 169 (1968);
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 218 (7th Ed. 2007); A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven
Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 888 (1998).

16

By virtue of facing a higher probability of detection, licensees who committed
unlicensed uses should face lower damage multipliers. In many instances, it is
plausible to assume that the probability of detecting unauthorized uses by licensees
is actually close to 1, in which case they need not face any multiplier at all, for there
to be adequate deterrence. These detected violators‐licensees should be liable only
for the harm caused (the owner’s lost profit), but not beyond. Unlicensed infringers,
by contrast, who were detected against the odds, should face a damage multiplier
and pay more than the harm they caused. Accordingly, a simple rule that awards
contract damages rather than infringement damages anytime the infringer also
happens to be a licensee goes in the right direction.
Despite this possible deterrence‐justification for the remedial dichotomy, I am
skeptical whether the actual rules operate in desirable way. For one, it is a clumsy
way to achieve a multiplier. If the reason to multiply damages is the low probability
of detection, this—and not the election of the greater among several sanctions—
should be the explicit multiplying criterion. Perhaps the disgorgement remedy is the
best the law can do to raise deterrence, given the practical constraints. One
constraint is the information about the probability of detection, which courts often
don’t have and cannot utilize to set the perfect multiplier. Another constraint is the
infringers’ inability to pay the full punitive measure; all they have is the money they
earned through infringement, which can be readily disgorged. Thus, combining
remedies and giving the aggrieved plaintiff the option to choose the greater can be
viewed as a quick mechanical fix for under‐detection, even if imperfect. This is the
same technique the law uses in other contexts. For example, fiduciary doctrines
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entitle a principal to choose a remedy against a breaching fiduciary agent. If the
agent embezzles the principal’s money and invests it, the agent is liable for the
greater of his benefit (equal to his investment profits) and the principal’s cost (the
nominal sum stolen).39
There is a more fundamental problem, however, with the imperfect detection
rationale for the dichotomous remedy regime. If a violations committed by licensees
are detectable, they require no multiplier. The law that gives the aggrieved owner a
bolstered right to recover—either by choosing an infringement remedy or through
the “greater of” ex‐post and ex‐ante measures of damages—multiplies the sanction
in the wrong set of cases.
Worse, both remedial dichotomies work to increase liability in the opposite
direction than the detection rationale suggests. Consider the effect of the greater of
ex‐post and ex‐ante damages. Recall from Example 1 above that the multiplier effect
is generated by the variance of ex‐post profits. The greater the variance, the higher
the expected damage. (In that example, a patent with 1% likelihood of $100,000
profit generated double the expected recovery compared to a patent with 100%
likelihood of $1000 profit, even though both have the same expected value.) There is
no a‐priori reason to think that high variance in the patentee’s profits would
correlate with low probabilities of detection. For one, if the probability of detection
depends on investment made by the patentee to detect, it is possible that the
patentee would invest more when the patent has the potential for extremely high
39

See Restatement (Second) of the Law of Agency §407 (1958); Ben‐Shahar and Mikos, supra
note 33, at 512.
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profits. Furthermore, it often is the case that the probability of detection is
correlated with the infringer’s success, not with the patentee’s profits. The more
profitable the infringement, the more likely it is to attract the attention of the
patentee (despite any efforts that the infringer might make to hide its profits).
Generally, infringements of patents are easy or difficult to detect depending more on
how they are used by the infringer than how profitable they are to the patentee.
Thus, the choice of remedy that the law grants the owner is worth more in cases of
high detection probability—contrary to the deterrence rationale.
Consider also the multiplier effect achieved through the breach/infringement
duality. It, too, is inconsistent with optimal deterrence theory. The law grants the
aggrieved licensor a right to recover infringement damages even when the violation
is easily detectable. For example, a licensee who violated the scope of the license
could be easier to detect that one who violated a negative promise. It may be easier
to detect an egregious violation by a licensee who ventures into wholly unrelated
activities (the book distributor who revises the book’s ending), than a more subtle
violation that is within the licensed activity (the distributor who launches the book
prematurely).
In sum, imperfect detection and enforcement does not appear to provide a
normative justification for the remedial structure in breach‐of‐license cases. We
have to look elsewhere.
B. Costly ExAnte Search
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Not all infringements are deliberate violations of rights known to be protected by IP
law. Many innovative technologies and products happen to overlap with existing
rights in ways that are not obvious, nor easy to predict. Thus, parties may infringe
inadvertently, as result of insufficient prior search for existing property rights. As
long as potential infringers are aware of the hazard of inadvertent infringement, the
damages they will have to pay for such infringements would operate as inducement
by law to make advance search. Metaphorically, the more landmines in the path, and
the more damaging these landmines are, the more cautious the traveler is likely to
be, and the more he will invest in mine detectors. Some travelers will choose to stay
off the path.
There is plenty of writing on the hardship, under existing systems, facing parties
who want to commercialize an idea and need to identify and navigate though prior
rights. In a crowded landscape of registered patents, for example, it is costly to
predict whether any particular use would run into the protected halos of other
patents. A substantial investment in search precaution is required to maneuver the
tight line between original and licensed innovation on one end and infringement on
the other.
How much search precaution is optimal is impossible to identify in the abstract, but
two observations are relevant to the context of unlicensed use. First, the easier it is
to search and find prior rights, the more substantial the damage measure ought to
be. Substantial damages induce ex‐ante search, which is a good result when search
is cheap and productive. If the infringement occurred in an area in which the patent
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landscape is barren, where it is easy to identify potential conflicting claims, and
where infringement is therefore obvious or blatant—and presumptively
deliberate—damages may well be bolstered. There is no risk that high damages
would lead to excessively costly search, because search is cheap. If, instead,
infringement occurred in a crowded patent environment, or where many registered
patents are likely to be invalidated, where innovative claims vary subtly and
incrementally, and where infringement is often a close call, damages multipliers run
the risk of inducing search that is too costly. This is a version of the chilling effect of
patent thickets, but here the distortion is not in chilling innovation altogether, but
rather in inducing excessive precautions in prior search.
There may be various implications to the social objective to reduce excessive ex‐
ante search, not all immediately relevant to the present context. For example, it may
yield a useful distinction between infringers who compete with the right holders
versus those who develop a new product or market.40 The former are more likely to
be aware of the potentially infringed rights—those embedded in the existing,
competed‐against, products—and should find it relatively easy to search for existing
rights. Or, this framework suggests that developers of products that implicate
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For a related argument that injunctions should be uniquely available to commercializing
patentees, see Benjamin H. Diessel, Trolling for Trolls: The Pitfalls of the Emerging Market
Competition Requirement for Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases Post‐EBAY, 106 Mich. L.
Rev. 305 (2007).
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numerous existing patents, for whom it is costly to identify all potential conflicting
claims, should face lower liability. 41
It does not appear, though, that the excessive search concern can justify different
treatment of infringers who exceeded and breached their licenses. Within the
population of infringers, those who also happen to be licensees and who breached
the scope of their license are systematically more likely to know and anticipate the
conflicting rights. A licensee is one who already identified the right holder,
acknowledged the right holder’s valid claim, and completed any necessary search of
the scope of the right. If this licensee now engages in an unlicensed use, it is not
because he was unaware of the conflicting right, nor because verifying this right was
too costly. A distributor who breaches the license by making an unauthorized use
does not need to make costly search to know that he is crossing a boundary. Thus,
the law that uniquely exempts the breaching licensee from super‐compensatory
damages is inconsistent with the search rationale.
C. Incentives to Negotiate a License
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Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
655, 671 (2009); Mark A. Lemley and Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 Tex.
L. Rev. 1991 (2007). Notice that this rationale for differentiating the remedies available to
commercializing versus non‐commercializing patentees is different from the one invoked
by courts and commentators in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). There, the concern was with granting injunctions
in favor of non‐practicing patentees. Injunctions would enable them to expropriate a
greater chunk of the surplus generated by their licensees. See also See, e.g., Richard Epstein,
The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal Response to a Premature
Obituary, 62 Stan. L.Rev. 455, 485‐495 (2010). Here, in contrast, the concern is that higher
liability burden would divert parties to choose voluntary transactions too often, even when
it is the costlier, inefficient mode of transfer.
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A canonical rationale for super‐compensatory remedies is the incentive they create
for consensual transfers. To avoid the harsh sanction, so goes the argument, a
potential violator would contract for the right—would negotiate and secure a paid‐
for license. When the costs of negotiating a license are lower than the cost of dispute
resolution, such incentive is desirable.
Unfortunately, this perspective does not explain the remedial rules for unlicensed
use. Specifically, it does not explain why already‐licensed parties, who exceed the
scope of their license and commit unauthorized use, sometimes face a smaller
expected remedy relative to infringers that never had any license in the first place.
Licensees are parties who have greater proximity to the right holders. They know
who the right holder is and they have contracted successfully before, suggesting that
transactions costs are not prohibitive. On the other hand, infringers who are
strangers and are not licensees may find it costly to contract with the right holders.
Thus, the idea that parties should face stiff remedies so that they will be induced to
negotiate and transact is more powerful and desirable when such parties are likely
to have low transactions costs. It would imply that licensees ought to face harsher
remedies for unlicensed use than the ones strangers face—the opposite of what the
law does.
Still, it may be argued that while transactions costs are higher for stranger case,
adjudications costs are also higher. Courts could have greater difficulty assessing the
right remedy in stranger cases, relative cases in which a prior license exists. When a
license already exists, there may be some metric for ascertaining the value of the
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right to the owner and the licensee and the relative bargaining strength. The
difficulty courts continue to face when assessing infringement remedies further
suggests that it would be desirable to induce parties to transact by threatening them
with high damages. I am skeptical, however, whether this explanation can account
for the doctrinal technique by which licensees receive more lenient treatment.
Recall that exclusive licensees face lower damages relative to nonexclusive licensees.
When there are many licensees, it is easier to quantify damages by reference to the
thicker market. Thus, if assessment errors were the underlying reason for using stiff
remedies, they would be used less often in cases of non‐exclusive licenses.

III. BREACH OR INFRINGEMENT?
Why do some violations by the licensee constitute breach while others constitute
infringement? What is the principle determining which is which? I argue in this
section that the existing legal rules searching for the line to draw between breach
and infringement are methodologically misguided. There is no natural,
technological, boundary between the two that can be identified by invoking
principles of contract and property, there is no “aroma” of copyright, nor can the
problem be resolved by reliance on abstract contract interpretation cannons.
Instead, the line between breach and infringement has to come from a more basic
inquiry: what is the best way to protect an owner’s entitlement. Breach or
infringement is not the test but rather the conclusion—the label we should affix to
the result of an analysis of optimal remedies. Characterizing a violation as an
infringement usually means that the remedy is augmented, to deter such violation in
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the first place. In contrast, characterizing a violation as breach of contract usually
means that the remedy merely acts as a price, giving the violator an option to breach
and pay damages. Sometimes the law wants to deter one‐sided taking of the
entitlement, to preserve the owner’s privilege to choose its counterpart. Other times
the law merely prices the entitlement and gives the violator a call option.
There is by now a mature literature studying the choice between the two vehicles of
entitlement protection—the familiar division between property rules versus
liability rules, prices versus sanctions, markets versus involuntary takings, and the
like. Breach versus infringement is yet another manifestation of this fundamental
divide. Within this methodology, the challenge is to determine when does the
presence of a contract—an IP license—change the protection to the owner from a
property rule to liability rule, and when it does not.
A. Should All Violations be “Breach”?
We can begin by asking why aren’t all violations “breach”? Why not apply a simple
rule that, once a license is entered into, all violations are breach, such that the
licensee can never commit infringements? Any unlicensed use by a licensee would
involve contract damages and nothing more. The licensed paperback publisher, for
example, would only be in breach—not infringement—regardless of the nature of
his violation, be it a wrongfully timed distribution of the copies, or publication of
unlicensed media, or the outrageous re‐writing of the ending of the story. The
magnitude of damages might vary according to the gravity of breach, but in either
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case they would follow the standard contract measure equal to the owner’s lost
profit.
This rule would constitute a call option granted to the licensee to take any element
of the entitlement and pay for it. It would make licenses “chunkier”—getting a
license would now amount to getting a set of call options on other rights, which non‐
licensed parties don’t have. For one, licenses would become more expensive. More
importantly, though, this chunky‐license regime is objectionable for the same
reasons that a universal call option regime is objectionable in any other context,
involving strangers. Strangers don’t have call options over the intellectual property
entitlements of owners, or over any other property rights.
Why? We can say that a system of options—either to buy or to sell without the
consent of the counterparty—subjects people to disruption of their freedom to “be
left alone.” Even if the strike price of the call option—the compensation to be paid to
the owner—is correctly assessed, and even if the result is consistent with ex‐post
efficiency, namely, more efficient users of the property end up owning it, there are
good reasons to object to transfers based on call options. The idea that people want
to be left alone and to choose their counterparties can be based on what some refer
to as “autonomy,” but it may also be grounded in familiar economic reasoning. The
ability to choose the identity of the buyer/transferee enables an owner to make
valuable determinations that would be forfeited if the owner were subjected to call
options.
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First, an owner wants to determine the privately desirable timing for the transfer,
rather than have that dictated by the taker. This is particularly valuable in a market
with volatile prices, or when there are tax consequences to the realized transaction.
For example, ownership of a financial security is often nothing more than a right to
select the timing to buy and sell. The value of assets stripped of the timing
prerogative could decline substantially.
Second, an owner wants to fit together the desired portfolio of diverse assets, so as
to balance risks and returns. Substituting an asset for cash would change the
character of the portfolio and the exposure to risk, and it could affect the value of
holding onto other assets, in ways that are difficult to assess compensate. Moreover,
assets are assembled together to complement each other and attain extra value
within the assemblage. A collector of art, for example, would lose more than the
market value of a painting, which singularly complemented the entire collection.
Third, an owner may want to choose the identity of the transferee, to generate
additional business and to bolster investments in relationships. The sale may be but
one element of an ongoing enterprise, and it is the value of this enterprise that is at
stake. For example, selling land adjacent to one’s home involves choosing one’s
neighbor, which could be quite valuable. Or, the right to choose a patent licensee
would affect the patentee’s design of the technology in the first place.
Fourth, owners may care who owns the asset or some rights in it because they
continue to have a property stake in it. A hotel proprietor, for example, wants to
control who occupies any single room because the tenant’s behavior can affect the
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value that can be derived from other parts of the property. Or, a franchisor wants to
control the use of the business trademark because the licensee’s use of it affects its
value to other franchisees, and to the business as a whole.
There are surely more economic reasons why an owner would want to control the
transfer of property. The owner may have prior conflicting commitments and
contracts regarding the use of the property; or, the owner may have an interest to
punish some poor‐behaving individuals and past violators by excluding them from
the property; or, the owner may want to freeze the asset in order to increase
demand and market price for other assets he owns; and, of course, an owner may
attach idiosyncratic value to the property—e.g., “keep it in the family”—such that
cannot be accurately assessed in damages.
Subjecting owners to call options would lead to these losses, but it could also lead to
another effect: owners taking measures to prevent the taking of their property—
building “fences.” If you can move into my home without my consent, my right to
recover compensatory damages may not dissuade me from installing preventive
measures: locks, fences, dogs, and the like. If you can use my intellectual property
without my consent, I will install digital locks and access restrictions, design
products that create smaller exposure to such unilateral takings, or try to bribe you
to cease. These wasteful activities are spared if the remedy operates to deter the
encroacher from one‐sided action. This is the same reason why people commonly
object to the other type of options—“put” options that enable sellers to impose
unsolicited sales upon buyers. Think of all the spam emails and junk mail offers that
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consumers get. They are enough of a nuisance that “Do Not Call” mechanisms need
to be devised. But if sellers had put options—if they were allowed to deliver the
product without the buyers’ saying yes and charge the buyers a legally set price—
people would have to constantly be on guard to dodge these unsolicited sales and
avoid getting stuck with the wrong set of benefits.
Nevertheless, we know that call options are used occasionally, in situations in which
these considerations are not present. The most prominent application of call
options is damages for breach of contract: the contractual entitlement can be taken
for a price—expectation damages. But not all breaches: some are subject to the call
option regime, other not. A mail carrier who fails to deliver the package containing a
spare shaft in time, or who loses it, would have to pay expectation damages to the
client. But a carrier who opens the package, appropriates the shaft, and uses it for
profit (e.g., sells it to another mill) would be subject to harsher remedies including
disgorgement of profit,42 intended to deter rather than price the infraction. The two
breaches are different because only the latter, but not the former, gives rise to the
set of concerns that underlie the owner’s right to choose. The client already decided
to ship the shaft and already chose the carrier to perform the shipping, but he did
not yet choose whether to sell the shaft and to whom. If the carriage delivery
promise is broken, the client’s only loss is the direct advantage he anticipated. If, on
the other hand, the package were to be sold by the carrier without permission, the
client would suffer additional losses. He might prefer to sell it by himself and find a
higher valuing buyer; or he might bear an unwanted or uninsured risk by the
42
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premature sale; or other assets of the client would loss value—the mill might be
worthless, his client relationship would suffer; or, other commercial investments the
client made may be squandered. The consequences from the sale of the shaft are
ones that the client has not yet elected or anticipated. Forcing them on him would
bring about the inefficient effects of call options.
B. Distinguishing Breach and Infringement
This account can shed light on the dividing line between the different violations of
an IP license. Return to the paperback edition publisher. His premature distribution
of copies is a costly breach, but it does not implicate the owner’s right to choose, or
any of the costs of unwanted call options. The owner already decided to carve out
this right and alienate it, and chose this publisher to run the paperback business.
True, the owner’s interest to synchronize the paperback license with other
licenses—here, the hardcover distribution—was partially thwarted by the
unfulfilled promise. But the loss is pecuniary and it is fully compensable by
expectation damages. And, importantly, the potential occurrence of such breach
would not drive the owner to take preventive measures, to build virtual fences.
On the other hand, if the paperback publisher were to violate the owner’s
entitlement by, say, rewriting the book’s ending, or by distributing the work in other
media, the author‐owner’s other concerns would be implicated. Even if the owner
does not suffer any immediate pecuniary loss of sales (the revised ending may
generate increased sales!), he may lose some potential value of the creation. He may
have planned a sequel based on the original plot; or he prefers to license other
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media distribution to other parties, more suitable to advance some goals or
investments of the owner; or an aesthetic value has been compromised; His
reputation may be affected, not to mention his moral rights. If a licensee had the
privilege to commit any violation and be subject only to contract damages, then
owners would lose the ability to carve out different rights to different parties. Once
the first license was given, the licensee would have a chunky call option on all
additional rights. The potential benefits from partitioning different rights to
different licensees, from creating numerous licensing relationships, and from
harnessing a diverse portfolio of specializations, would be squandered.
Further, an owner who can only get lost profits against this type of violation would
likely take self‐help measures to prevent such takings. He would self‐publish; or
license the publication only to trustworthy and reputable publisher (forgoing
discounts offered by entrants); or use content dissemination media that cannot be
altered; or alter the timing of the various distribution modes; or charge higher
prices.
Thus, for the same reasons that strangers should not have call options on the
owners’ IP rights, licensees too should not have the options to take rights that go
beyond what they acquired through the license—rights which the owners would
want to license separately. In fact, there is a reason to treat violations by licensees
even more harshly than violations by strangers. Stiff penalties for non‐consensual
taking would induce the violator to negotiate the additional use right with the
owner. When there is already a preexisting narrower license, this incentive‐to‐
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negotiate is desirable because transactions costs are comparatively low. By virtue of
having negotiated the original license, the parties are known to be able to reach
agreement: they identify each other and can overcome contracting hurdles.
One way to identify the optimal reach of call options is to mimic the lines parties
draw through the use of liquidated damages. When the violator is intended to have a
call option, we often find that parties include a liquidated damage clause in their
license contracts to account for such option. Many contracts contain definitions of
material breach and assign a damages figure. Timely performance is one of the more
common triggers of liquidated damages and “late fees.” In fact, courts correctly
interpret the presence of a contracted‐for remedy scheme as indication that the
violation to which this scheme applies is merely breach, not infringement.43 That is,
anticipating that such behavior might occur, the parties stipulated the remedial
consequence, and did not deem it necessary to take any other precaution against it.
A law that assesses expectation damages for these offenses merely mimics what
many parties already do.
But parties do not write liquidated damage clauses to deal with the distributor’s
change of book content, because they do not want to set a price for such behavior:
they want to eliminate it. They may take some precautions against such violations
(e.g., by checking the publisher’s page proofs). But mostly, they rely on the law to
deter them altogether.
Conclusion
43
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This article identified two distortions that emerge from the unclear boundaries
between legal rules. The first fuzzy boundary is between breach and infringement.
Two conducts that are almost identical in circumstances could lead to dramatically
different remedial consequences by being classified differently, one as breach of
contract and the other as infringement of property right. The second fuzzy boundary
is between the right to recover ex‐post versus an ex‐ante measures of damages. As
information about the loss emerges, there are different ways to calculate it. But, it
turns out, the probabilistic nature of the loss creates a portfolio of remedies that
over‐compensate right holders.
These problems are not unique to remedies for unlicensed use. The
contract/property boundary is a fundamental design feature in private law. For
example, the law applying to physical neighbors, and specifically the law that
assesses recovery for breach of neighbors’ rights, has to make subtle choices
between contractual versus disgorgement measures, between cost‐based versus
benefit‐based measures. Or, the law of pre‐contract, applying to parties who entered
a negotiation, searches for sanctions that walk a delicate line between contract and
property, between harm and benefit.
Likewise, the problematic interface between ex‐post and ex‐ante measures of
recovery is a general problem that comes up often, anytime the law has to assess
recovery for probabilistic harm or benefit. Actions that appear identical ex ante
may—like lottery tickets or insurance policies—have different ex post valuations.
The analysis in this article focused on the stochastic value of IP rights, but it can
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shed similar light on remedies for other probabilistic entitlements: investments in
improving others’ property or in insuring it, appropriation of chances, assessment of
unrealized value, and the like. In various areas, the law of remedies allows parties to
choose among several recovery measures, effectively granting them super‐
compensation.
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